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ABSTRACT

Aware that children conceive of different types of trust, a study examined 60 children's conception of trust. The subjects comprised three age groups: 6-7 years old, 8-9 years old, and 10-11 years old. Each subject was interviewed on the basis of three stories. The stories depicted a hypothesized violation of trust in a moral context (lying), social-conventional context (dress code), and psychological context (helping a friend in time of psychological need). Each story presented a hypothetical situation in which the subject played a central role. Each story-trust interview included questions pertaining to the children's (1) evaluations and justifications of the rightness or wrongness of trust violations, (2) how trust can be reestablished after it is broken, (3) how trust helps maintain children's friendships, and (4) whether trust violations result in the victim having negative feelings toward the trust violator. Within each context it was examined whether, and if so how, each trust violation would lessen feelings of friendship. Results showed that moral and psychological trust, and not social-conventional trust, were qualities that comprised criteria by which the children maintained both intimate and casual friendships. In addition, moral trust, once violated, was more difficult to re-establish than social-conventional and psychological trust. A list of references, nine tables of data, samples of stories used in the interviews, descriptions of responses, and examples of each justification category are appended. (HOD)

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Children's Conceptions of Trust

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Rotter (1980) has argued that people who trust are more likely to be honest, tolerant, happy, and respectful of the rights of others. Thus Rotter's conclusion (which may not go far beyond common sense) is that parents and educators ought to encourage the development of trust in children. Toward this end, an initial step is understanding how children conceive of trust.

To date, only a few studies have examined children's developing conceptions of trust. For the most part, these studies (e.g., Selman, Jaquette, and Lavin, 1977; Rotenberg, 1980) have shown that children's conceptions of trust form a unitary system, wherein thought develops from a concrete, egocentric orientation (e.g., trusting a friend not to break a toy) to a relational, perspective orientation (e.g., trust in friendship entails sharing secrets and supporting each other's intimate and personal concerns).

The objective of this study was to examine the development of children's conceptions of trust from the theoretical perspective of distinct conceptual domains (Turiel, 1977, 1983a, 1983b). Three domains (systems of thought that structure social knowledge) have been identified: the moral, societal, and psychological. In brief, the moral domain has been defined as prescriptive judgments of justice, rights, and welfare; the societal domain as concepts of systems of social relations and organization (e.g., social conventions); and the psychological domain as concepts of persons or psychological systems (Turiel, 1983a).

Based on this theoretical perspective, it was hypothesized that in social relations children conceive of different types of trust — that is, have different types of interpersonal expectations of one another — depending on the domain-specific context in which the interpersonal expectation is embedded. For instance, it is possible that while children trust friends not to lie (moral trust), that such trust is conceptualized as obligatory in that all people ought not to lie. Conversely, while children may also trust friends to provide emotional support (psychological trust), such trust may be conceptualized as at least partly contingent on the specific relationship. Thus in this study we set out to examine children's conceptions of trust in moral, social-conventional, and psychological contexts.

Within each context, we were specifically interested in children's conceptions of trust regarding four main issues. The first comprised children's evaluations and justifications of the rightness or wrongness of trust violations. The second issue was concerned with how trust helps maintain children's friendships; the third issue with how trust can be re-established after it is broken; and the fourth issue with whether trust violations result in the victim having negative feelings toward the trust violator. Moreover, it was hypothesized that at least some conceptions of trust (e.g., trusting a friend to provide emotional support, as mentioned above) vary depending on the previous degree of intimacy in a friendship. Thus, for all but the first issue (which focused minimally on the actors) conceptions of trust in two levels of friendships were investigated: trust in an intimate friendship and trust in a casual friendship.

Methods and Data Source:

Sixty subjects participated in this study. There were 20 children, half male, half female, in each of three age groups: 6-7 years old, 8-9 years old, and 10-11 years old. Each subject was administered a semi-structured clinical interview

lasting approximately 40 minutes. The interview consisted of three stories. The stories depicted a hypothesized violation of trust in a moral context (lying), social-conventional context (dress code), and psychological context (helping a friend in time of psychological need). The consequences of the three trust violations were approximately equal in magnitude. The first group of thirty subjects received the stories in the following order: moral, social-conventional, psychological. For the second group of thirty subjects, the order was reversed: psychological, social-conventional, moral.

Each story presented a hypothetical situation in which the subject plays a central role (so as to personalize the story for subjects). The moral trust story depicts a friend telling the subject that he (or she for a female subject) left his lunch at home. The friend asks if the subject would share his lunch. The subject agrees. Later in the afternoon, the subject learns that his friend actually had his lunch, and had said he left it at home so he could get more food. Thus this story sets up and then violates the moral expectation that one's friend will tell the truth. The social-conventional trust story depicts the subject inviting a friend to a fancy restaurant, in celebration of the subject's birthday. When the subject and his mother pick up the friend on the way to the restaurant, they find that the friend is going to wear blue jeans and a torn work shirt to the restaurant. This story sets up and then violates an expectation that one's friend will adhere to conventional dress standards. Finally, in the psychological trust story the subject is feeling sad, and so he goes over to a friend's house to play. Even though the subject knows his friend likes to watch television on this particular day, he tells his friend he is feeling sad and asks if he would play. The friend acknowledges that the subject is feeling sad but decides to watch television. This story sets up and then violates

the expectation that a friend will forgo a personal pleasure in order to help another friend though an emotional difficulty. (See Appendix A for a copy of each story.)

Each trust-story interview included questions pertaining to the four major issues under investigation. The first issue comprised subjects' justifications for their evaluations of the rightness or wrongness of each trust violation. As in previous research (e.g., Davidson, Turiel, and Black, 1983; Nucci and Nucci, 1982; Smetana, 1982), justifications provide a basis for tapping the form of reasoning for domain-specific events. It was expected that the different contexts of violations of trust would elicit different types of justifications. To capture as adequately as possible subject's reasoning, subjects were probed for multiple justifications, all of which were later coded in analysis. The second issue, dealing with how trust helps maintain friendships, was pursued by asking subjects two standard questions: whether the violation in each story would lessen feelings of friendship (1) with an intimate friend, and (2) with a casual friend. In addition, subjects' reasoning was systematically probed for why each trust violation would or would not affect their relationship with their intimate friend. The third issue concerned the difficulties involved in re-establishing trust after it is broken. Subjects were posed with four more standard questions: whether trust could be restored through (1) an intimate friend's apology, (2) a casual friend's apology, (3) an intimate friend's explicit statement not to repeat the violation, and (4) a casual friend's explicit statement not to repeat the violation. Finally, the fourth issue comprised subjects' evaluations and justifications for whether they would have negative feelings toward a trust violator, and, if so (as it was hypothesized), whether those negative feelings would be greater for an intimate friend or casual friend, or the same for both types of friends.

Coding and Reliability:

A coding manual was derived from one half of the data (30 subjects total, ten subjects in each of the three age groups). The coding manual was then used to code the other half of the data (the remaining 30 subjects). The results were then combined for qualitative and statistical analyses.

Three types of data were coded. First, justifications were coded based on a system adapted from Davidson et al. (1983). (See Appendix B for summary definitions and examples of each justification category.) Second, as part of Issue 2, subjects were probed for their reasons as to why a violation of trust would or would not lessen feelings of friendship with an intimate friend. The analysis of responses regarding subject's views towards relationships revealed what we refer to as relational orientations. That is, these orientations reflect subject's central bases for defining friendship relations. (See Appendix C for summary definitions and examples of each relational orientation.) Finally, evaluative responses were coded based on their corresponding range. For instance, in questions concerned with whether a trust violation would or would not lessen feelings of friendship, negative ("less intimate") and positive ("same") responses were elicited and thus coded.

Interjudge reliability was assessed by a second judge coding 20 interviews. The second judge was not aware of the subjects' age or sex, or of the hypotheses of the study. The interviews were randomly selected from the second group of 30 subjects. Two methods were used to assess interjudge reliability for subjects' justifications of the rightness or wrongness of each trust violation. The first method assessed reliability for each justification. This method resulted in 73% interjudge agreement. The second method examined reliability for each domain, collapsing the justifications according to the domain in which they were predominantly associated. This method resulted in 85% interjudge agreement. Reliability was assessed for the six standard evaluative questions mentioned earlier (pertaining to how each trust

violation did or did not affect an intimate and a casual friendship, and whether an apology or an explicit statement not to repeat the violation from an intimate and a casual friend would re-establish trust). Interjudge reliability was 91%. In addition, interjudge reliability was 77% for the relational orientations, and 97% for the specific evaluative question of whether the trust violation would negatively affect a casual friendship more, less, or the same amount as an intimate friendship.

Results:

The results are grouped according to the four issues listed above.

Issue 1: Justifications for evaluations of the rightness or wrongness of trust violation. Table 1 shows a tally of the justifications used for each trust story. Results show that subjects predominately used different justifications, depending on the story, to support their judgments of whether the trust violation was all right or not all right. In the moral trust story, 99% of the justifications comprise four categories: fairness, obligation, maintaining or establishing relationships, and welfare. In the social-conventional story, 98% of the justifications comprise the three categories of custom or tradition, social discomfort, and personal choice. Finally, in the psychological story, 97% of the justifications comprise the two categories of interpersonal emotional concern and personal choice. The only justification that was substantially used for more than one story was the personal choice justification, which, as just noted, was used for both the social-conventional and psychological trust story.

Issue 2: Conceptions of how trust helps maintain friendships. This issue was pursued by following two different approaches, each reported separately below.

Approach 1: In the first approach, subjects were asked two standard questions: whether the violation in each story would lessen feelings of friendship

(1) with an intimate friend, and (2) with a casual friend. In general, the results support the proposition that moral and psychological trust, and not social conventional trust, are qualities that comprise criteria by which children maintain both intimate and casual friendships.

Table 2 presents the percent of subjects who would feel less intimate with an intimate friend after the violations of trust in each domain-specific story. The results show that feelings of friendship were diminished with an intimate friend for 76% of the subjects after the violation in the moral story, for 17% of the subjects after the violation in the social-conventional story, and for 76% of the subjects after the violation in the psychological story.

Though the results reported in Table 2 are presented (for clarity) as if each category is independent of one another, the categories comprise a repeated measure design, which is reflected in the statistical analysis. Subjects' judgments were assigned an indicator code of 0 for Less Intimate and 1 for Same. The results were then analyzed using Cochran's Q as a test of equality of correlated proportions. Eta-squared was used as the measure of association, thus providing the proportion of explained variance due to the different trust stories. In addition, a significant Cochran's Q was followed with a post hoc analysis on the mean ranked scores of the three pairwise contrasts. Results showed a significant association between story type and response: $Q(2) = 54.44$, $p < .001$. Eta-squared = .46. Two pairwise contrasts were significant. Moral to social-conventional: $Z = -6.39$, $p < .001$; and psychological to social-conventional: $Z = -6.39$, $p < .001$. These results support the proposition that both moral and psychological trust are qualities by which children maintain intimate friendships.

Table 3 presents the percent of subjects who would feel less intimate with a casual friend (to provide a contrast to the previous question which had been posed in

the context of an intimate friendship). Two analyses were performed: first, whether story type was significantly associated with subjects' trust judgments to lessen feelings of intimacy with a casual friend after each of the story violations; second, whether a difference in the quality of a friendship changed subjects' feelings of intimacy toward the friend who committed the violation.

As shown in Table 3, subjects' feelings of friendship diminished with a casual friend for 77% of the subjects after the violation in the moral story, for 37% after the violation in the social-conventional story, and for 68% after the violation in the psychological story. Statistical analysis showed a significant association between story type and response: $Q(2) = 23.11$, $p < .001$. Eta-squared = .20. Two pairwise contrasts were significant. Moral to social-conventional: $Z = -4.57$, $p < .001$; and psychological to conventional: $Z = -3.58$, $p < .005$. These results support the proposition that both moral and psychological trust are qualities by which children maintain casual friendships.

To answer whether a difference in the quality of a friendship changed subjects' feelings of intimacy toward the friend who committed the violation, the results from Table 3 were analyzed in relation to the results from Table 2. For each story type, a McNemar test was performed to determine if a significant change occurred in subjects' judgments when the quality of the friendship changed from being intimate to casual. A significant change was found in only the social-conventional story. $X_M^2(1) = 8.84$, $p < .005$, eta-squared = .15. 17% of the subjects would feel less intimate with an intimate friend after the violation in the social-conventional story, compared to 37% who under the same conditions would feel less intimate with a casual friend.

An examination of subjects' reasoning sheds light on this one significant finding. The majority of subjects who changed their judgments in the social-conventional story from not lessening feelings of friendship with an intimate friend

to lessening feelings of friendship with a casual friend weighed how much social discomfort they would tolerate against how much their friend meant to them. For example, one six-year old child said:

> [My kind of friend would drop] because she was just kind of a friend. AND HOW DOES THAT MAKE A DIFFERENCE? A kind of a friend is just starting to be a friend. She's not really a friend yet. But a real friend is already a friend. WHY WOULD THE FRIEND DROP JUST BECAUSE THEY DRESSED POORLY? Well, I wouldn't really like it. WHY WOULDN'T A BEST FRIEND DROP, THEN? They might drop a tiny bit. UH UH. AND WHY WOULD THEY DROP? Well, it's already a best friend, so they wouldn't really drop. I already really like her a lot. AND WHY WOULD A KIND OF A FRIEND DROP? Because I don't really like her.

For this child, as for others, the limited benefits of maintaining the previous degree of intimacy with a casual friend did not outweigh her dislike of the consequences of the violation. Thus while the social-conventional story violation usually produced negative emotional consequences (e.g., social discomfort), the violation diminished feelings of friendship more with a casual friend than intimate friend. This finding suggests that the interpersonal bond of a close friendship depends on other qualities than those expectations set up and violated in the social-conventional story.

Approach 2: To assess in more depth how trust helps maintain friendship, a close examination was made of the form of subjects' reasoning for why they would or would not feel less intimate with an intimate friend after each of the trust violations. Across all three stories, a conceptual progression was found. The 6-7-year-old subjects mainly held a personal or phenomenal orientation. They based their judgments on personal likes and dislikes (e.g., "[she wouldn't be my very best friend anymore] because she was lying to me"), and/or on reiterating salient facts that define the violation (e.g., "[she would drop a bit] because she lied to me"). The 8-9-year-old subjects mainly held a magnitudinal orientation. They based their judgments on the number of times the friend committed the violation (e.g., "she would

still be my friend as long as she didn't do it a lot of times") and/or on the magnitude of the consequences of the violation:

> He would still be my best friend. I'd probably forget about it and it's a little thing. But if he told a lie about something bigger. Like if he stole a clock from me, or something, that I would be mad and he would drop a little. But that's not what happened.

Finally, the 10-11-year-old subjects held mainly a relational orientation. They supported their judgments on the basis of how the violation did or did not affect their interpersonal relationships. For example:

> I think he would drop a little bit. AND WHY IS THAT? Well, I wouldn't, after he lied to me, I wouldn't trust him. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY TRUST? I wouldn't rely on him or have anything to do with him as much. WHY IS THAT? Well, because I don't play with people who lie.

Table 4 shows the percent of subjects in each domain-specific story who held each of the above conceptual orientations. These results were analyzed using a one-tailed Kendall's Tau test for ordered qualitative variables (age and orientation). For each story, a significant association was found. In the moral story, Tau = .41, $Z = 4.53$, $p < .001$. In the social-conventional story, Tau = .30, $Z = 3.17$, $p < .001$. And in the psychological story, Tau = .45, $Z = 5.04$, $p < .001$. Thus these results point to a developmental trend: in assessing violations of trust caused by intimate friends, children's conceptions appear to develop from a personal/phenomenal orientation to a magnitudinal orientation and finally to a relational orientation.

These results could be interpreted to support previous research (Selman, et al., 1977; Rotenberg, 1980) that shows conceptions of trust progressing from an egocentric to perspective state. However, on the basis of justification categories, subjects' reasoning about the different types of trust were found in this study to reflect underlying differences between domains. Thus it is our view that the similarities across domains on the basis of conceptual orientations reflect isomorphic development within each domain rather than a global intellectual shift from egocentrism to perspectivism.

Issue 3: Difficulties involved in re-establishing trust after it is broken. This issue was pursued by asking subjects four standard questions: whether trust could be restored through (1) an intimate friend's apology, (2) a casual friend's apology, (3) an intimate friend's explicit statement not to repeat the violation, and (4) a casual friend's explicit statement not to repeat the violation. In general, the results support the proposition that moral trust is more difficult to re-establish than social-conventional trust and psychological trust.

(1) This question examined whether trust could be restored through an intimate friend's apology. As shown in Table 5, 23% of the subjects would re-establish moral trust after an intimate friend apologized, compared to 80% who would re-establish social-conventional trust, and 55% who would re-establish psychological trust.

Subjects' judgments were assigned an indicator code of 0 for Would Not Trust Again, 1 for Maybe Trust Again, and 2 for Would Trust Again. The results were analyzed using a Friedman test (which is an extension of Cochran's Q for more than 2 dependent variables), and pairwise post hoc contrasts on ranked means. Results showed a significant association between story type and response: $X^2_r(2) = 26.91$, $p < .001$, eta-squared = .22. Two pairwise contrasts were significant. Moral to social-conventional: $Z = -5.16$, $p < .001$; and moral to psychological: $Z = -3.06$, $p < .01$. Thus, in general, moral trust was more difficult to re-establish with an intimate friend by the means of an apology than was trust in a social-conventional or psychological context.

(2) This question examined whether trust could be restored through a casual friend's apology. As shown in Table 6, only 7% of the subjects would re-establish moral trust after a casual friend apologized, compared to 56% who would re-establish social-conventional trust, and 40% who would re-establish psychological trust. As in

the results to the previous question, the striking result here is subjects' reluctance to re-establish moral trust.

Statistical analysis showed a significant association between story type and response: $X^2_r(2) = 25.39$, $p < .001$, eta-squared = .23. Two pairwise contrasts were significant. Moral to social-conventional: $Z = -4.86$, $p < .001$; and moral to psychological: $Z = -3.58$, $p < .005$. Taken together with the results from the previous question, these results support the proposition that in casual and intimate friendships moral trust is more difficult to re-establish by means of an apology than either social-conventional or psychological trust.

In reasoning about intimate and casual friendships for the above two questions, subjects' reasons for their judgments follow similar patterns. These patterns, briefly stated, are as follows. In the moral trust story, subjects brought up two main concerns: (1) They would not believe the friend because they thought the friend may trick them again, since they were already tricked once (e.g., "I wouldn't believe him, because he said it [lied] one time"); and (2) they would believe the friend because they interpreted an apology as meaning a promise not to lie again, and the promise was believed. Subjects who were unsure whether or not to trust the casual friend after an apology often contrasted both of these concerns.

In the social-conventional and psychological trust stories, subjects often justified their judgments on the basis of two concerns. Subjects who were unsure whether to restore either social-conventional or psychological trust often emphasized the personal choice aspect of the violation (e.g., "There is a chance she may not [play], because she may be trying to say 'I told you I wanted to watch TV'"). None of the subjects in this category interpreted an apology as meaning a promise (e.g., "There is a chance he wouldn't [dress nicely], because he didn't say he would."). On the other hand, subjects who would fully restore either social-conventional or psychological trust often reasoned that an apology virtually means a promise not to

repeat the violation, and the apology was believed (e.g., "When you apologize, you say that you are sorry and you don't do it again").

(3) This question examined whether trust could be restored through an intimate friend's explicit statement not to repeat the violation. As shown in Table 7, 24% of the subjects would re-establish moral trust, compared to 86% who would re-establish social-conventional trust, and 71% who would re-establish psychological trust.

The results were analyzed with a Friedman test. Results showed a significant association. $X^2_r(2) = 29.24$, $p < .001$. Eta-squared = .27. Two pairwise contrasts were significant. Moral to social-conventional: $Z = -5.15$, $p < .001$; and moral to psychological: $Z = -4.00$, $p < .001$. These results (and subjects' corresponding reasoning) parallel the results from the condition when the intimate friend apologized instead of providing a statement not to repeat the violation. In both conditions, subjects were reluctant to re-establish moral trust with an intimate friend after that trust was violated.

(4) This question examined whether trust could be restored through a casual friend's explicit statement not to repeat the violation. As shown in Table 8, 15% of the subjects would re-establish moral trust, compared to 66% who would re-establish social-conventional trust, and 42% who would re-establish psychological trust.

Results showed a significant association between story type and response: $X^2_r(2) = 18.20$, $p < .001$, eta-squared = .17. Two pairwise contrasts were significant. Moral to social-conventional: $Z = -4.22$, $p < .001$; and moral to psychological: $Z = -2.62$, $p < .05$. These results parallel the results from the condition when the casual friend apologizes. In both conditions (as in both conditions with an intimate friend) the striking feature is subjects' reluctance to re-establish moral trust with a casual friend after that trust is violated.

Issue 4: This issue addressed the question of whether there would be negative feelings toward a trust violator, and, if so (as it was hypothesized), whether those negative feelings would be greater for an intimate friend or casual friend, or the same for both types of friends. Before explaining the rationale for the statistical analysis used on the results, it is necessary to delineate first the orientations that comprise subjects' judgments.

As shown in Table 9, across all three stories 20%-35% of the 6-7-year-old subjects said they would be more upset with their casual friend than intimate friend. On the whole, these subjects based their judgments on their understanding that an intimate friend is more important than a casual friend, and if they got upset with their intimate friend, they would lose that friendship. For example, one six-year-old child said:

> [Moral story.] My best friend, I would say, "that's okay, it's all right." But with the other friend, I would say "nope, I'm not your friend." WHY? Because that could be my only friend. GOOD POINT. I HAD ONE PERSON TELL ME THAT THEY WOULD BE MORE UPSET WITH A BEST FRIEND BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T EXPECT A BEST FRIEND TO DO SOMETHING LIKE THAT. WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT WHAT THAT PERSON SAID? I think it's good. WOULD YOU BE MORE UPSET WITH YOUR BEST FRIEND OR LESS UPSET? Less. BECAUSE? Because if she wasn't my friend, I wouldn't have any friends.

The other dominant judgment 6-7-year-old subjects made was that they would be equally upset with their intimate friend and casual friend. These subjects usually based their judgments on their understanding that both friends had committed the same violation.

> [Moral story.] It really wouldn't make any difference. WHY IS THAT? Because what he did was, it was the same thing what my best friend and my kind of a friend did. So it really wouldn't make any difference.

In presenting the results to Issue 2, it was shown that 6-7 year olds mainly held a personal or phenomenal orientation to whether an intimate friend would lessen in intimacy after each trust violation. These two components of this orientation can help explain the 6-7-year-olds' judgments regarding with whom they would be more

upset. Recall that the first component, a personal orientation, is characterized by judgments based on personal likes and dislikes (e.g., "because I really wanted to play with him," "because he did something I don't like"). It is this same orientation of personal desires (combined with the assessment that getting mad at a friend entails losing that friend) that helps explain subjects' judgment to be more upset with the casual friend: Based on personal desires, subjects would not want to lose a best friend.

The second component, a phenomenal orientation, is characterized by judgments based on reiterating salient facts that define the violation (e.g., "Because she lied to me," "Because he didn't do anything to me"). Similarly, in explaining their judgments for why they would be equally upset with an intimate and casual friend, subjects reiterated the salient feature of the specific action (e.g., "Because what he did was, it was the same thing what my best friend and my kind of a friend did"). Subjects focused on a description of what occurred or what should have occurred as a basis for their judgment.

Approximately 50% of the subjects in the second age group of 8-9 year olds, and 20% of the 10-11 year olds, made similar judgments supported by similar reasons as those of the youngest group. However, approximately 40% of the 8-9 year olds, and 70% of the 10-11 year olds, said they would be more upset with their intimate friend because they had not expected the intimate friend to commit the violation. For example:

> [9 years old.] Probably my best friend. Because I least expected him to do it. Because he was my best friend than another friend. I HAD ANOTHER PERSON SAY THAT THEY WOULD BE UPSET WITH BOTH OF THEM THE SAME AMOUNT BECAUSE THEY BOTH DID THE SAME THING. WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THAT? I think it's a difference of opinion. Because, like I said, my best friend is least expected to do it.
>
> [11 years old.] Yeah, because you would be losing a lot more with your best friend who you always hang around with and always trust and always like. With your kind of a friend who you probably don't always play

around with and you probably don't always trust. And you probably don't always think about her as someone who you can go to.

These examples of reasoning can be characterized by a relational orientation in that subjects coordinated the effect of the violation with interpersonal concepts. That is, the violation was judged not on the basis of a personal preference against or a description of the violation (a personal or phenomenal orientation), but on an expectation derived from understanding the attitudes and responsibilities of friends of varying intimacy.

It is suggested, then, that two orientations towards relationships can characterize the form of reasoning found in the three possible judgments to the question of with whom subjects would be more upset. A personal or phenomenal orientation characterizes the judgment to be either more upset with the casual friend or equally upset with both the casual and intimate friend. A relational orientation characterizes the judgment to be more upset with the intimate friend.

Because two categories ("casual friend" and "upset the same with both") can be characterized by the same orientation (personal/phenomenal), both categories were grouped before statistically analyzing the results. On the basis of age, this combined group was then compared with the group of subjects who said they would be more upset with their intimate friend. Kendall's Tau for ordered qualitative variables was used on each of the three stories. Since previous research (e.g., Damon, 1977; Selman, 1977; Turiel, 1983b) has established that children develop an increasing level of sophistication in their social reasoning (although the theoretical model of this increase is debated), a one-tailed test for significance was used. Results showed a significant association between age and judgment in all three stories. In the moral story, Tau = -.38, Z = -1.75, $p < .04$. In the social-conventional story, Tau = -.42, Z = -1.68, $p < .05$. Finally, in the psychological story, Tau = -.54, Z = -2.48, $p < .007$. These results establish that the younger

subjects would be more upset with a casual friend or equally upset with a casual friend and intimate friend, while the older subjects would be more upset with an intimate friend.

Conclusion:

Children's conceptions of trust were examined in what were hypothesized to be three distinct social contexts: moral, social-conventional, and psychological. Within each context, it was examined whether, and if so how, each trust violation would lessen feelings of friendship. This issue was systematically examined by asking subjects, in the context of both an intimate and casual friendship, (a) whether the friend would still be just as good a friend after the trust violation, (b) whether trust could be restored through the friend's apology, and (c) whether trust could be restored through the friend's explicit statement not to repeat the violation. In general, the results show two major findings. First, moral and psychological trust, and not social conventional trust, are qualities that comprise criteria by which children maintain both intimate and casual friendships. And, second, once violated, moral trust is more difficult to re-establish than social-conventional and psychological trust. It is perhaps because of the obligatory nature of moral trust (i.e., a person ought not to lie) that such a violation appears to undermine a friendship to such a large degree.

While subjects differentiated the moral and psychological contexts of trust, the nature and extent of this distinction requires further investigation. In one regard, the psychological context did tap what we have referred to as psychological reasoning (e.g., a recognition of the internal states of another and the legitimacy of personal choices). At the same time, however, subjects conceptualized the psychological context as entailing a welfare (moral) component. It may be that the psychological story tapped both psychological concepts and moral reasoning bearing on the

obligation to help a friend in need of emotional support.

However, there are two potentially important differences between the type of reasoning applied to the moral trust story and that applied to the psychological trust story. Whereas the perceived obligation not to deceive another was regarded as non-contingent, the obligation to provide emotional support may be viewed as contingent on the prior existence of a relationship between the persons involved. In addition, the former entailed the avoidance of a harmful act (lying), and the latter entailed taking action to help someone in need. Further research is need to clarify differences and similarities between concepts of contingent and non-contingent moral obligations, as well as of acts of omission and commission.

Educational Implications: Two educational implications follow readily from the results of this study. First, in promoting trust in children, an inductive method (where adults point out to children the results of their actions) could profit by highlighting to children the justifications that children often find persuasive in reasoning about trust violations. For example, in encouraging a child to be trustworthy while borrowing other people's belongings (moral trust), one could point out to the child that one ought to return the belonging on time for otherwise the child unfairly has the belonging while the rightful owner does not have the belonging (a fairness justification). An adult could also, when appropriate, point out that the other person's well-being may be harmed in his or her no longer having the belonging (a welfare justification). (For instance, if one fails to return a book to a friend in time for the friend to study for an exam, the friend's welfare may be hurt by the consequences of a lower exam score.) Conversely, in encouraging a child to be trustworthy in terms of helping friends when they feel sad (psychological trust), one could point out that while the act may not be something the child must do (a personal choice justification), still it would make the other child feel a lot

better (an interpersonal emotional concern justification). In other words, justifications that map on to specific kinds of trust events will likely be most efficient in allowing the child to recognize and assess for him or herself the features and consequences of a trust event and trust violation.

A second educational implication follows from the progression found in subjects' orientations toward defining friendship relations. Recall that 6-7-year-old subjects mainly held a personal or phenomenal orientation. They based their judgments on personal likes and dislikes and/or on reiterating salient facts that define the violation. The 8-9-year-old subjects mainly held a magnitudinal orientation. They based their judgments on the number of times the friend committed the violation and/or on the magnitude of the consequences of the violation. Finally, the 10-11 year-old subjects mainly held a relational orientation. They supported their judgments on the basis of how the violation did or did not affect their interpersonal relationships. We suggest that as children get older, they should be encouraged to recognize how a trust violation affects each relationship from the perspectives of all people involved, not simply from their own perspective or by assessing the magnitude of the consequences of the violation.

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Table 1. Tally of Justification Categories Used for Each Domain-Specific Trust Story. (N = 60. Some subjects gave multiple justifications: all justifications were coded for each subject.)

	Trust Story		
Justification Category	Moral	Social-conventional	Psychological
Appeal to Fairness	24	0	0
Obligation	23	0	0
Maintain or Establishing Relationships	14	0	1
Other's Physical Welfare	8	0	0
Custom or Tradition	0	31	1
Social Discomfort	0	26	1
Personal Choice	0	22	39
Interpersonal Emotional Concern	1	2	48

Table 2: Percent of Subjects Who Would Feel Less Intimate with an Intimate Friend After the Violation of Trust in Each Domain-Specific Story (Repeated Measure Design).

	Story		
Judgment	Moral n = 59	Social-conventional n = 59	Psychological n = 59
Less Intimate	76	17	76
Same	24	83	24

Table 3: Percent of Subjects Who Would Feel Less Intimate with a Casual Friend After the Violation in Each Domain-Specific Story (Repeated Measure Design).

	Story		
Judgment	Moral n = 57	Social-conventional n = 57	Psychological n = 57
Less Intimate	77	37	68
Same	23	63	32

Table 4: Proportionate Use of Conceptual Orientations by Different Age Groups in Response to Whether an Intimate Friend Would Lessen in Intimacy After the Moral Trust Violation.

Moral Story

Conceptual Orientation	Age 6-7 n = 19	8-9 n = 18	10-11 n = 20
Personal or Phenomenal	90	28	10
Magnitudinal	5	33	15
Relational	5	39	75

Social-Conventional Story

Conceptual Orientation	Age 6-7 n = 17	8-9 n = 17	10-11 n = 19
Personal or Phenomenal	71	24	11
Magnitudinal	12	35	26
Relational	18	41	63

Psychological Story

Conceptual Orientation	Age 6-7 n = 20	8-9 n = 20	10-11 n = 20
Personal or Phenomenal	90	35	0
Magnitudinal	5	15	5
Relational	5	50	95

Table 5: Percent of Subjects With Whom an Apology Re-established Trust With an Intimate Friend After the Violation in Each Domain-Specific Story (Repeated Measure Design).

	Story		
Judgment	Moral n = 60	Social-conventional n = 60	Psychological n = 60
Would Trust Again	23	80	55
Maybe Trust Again	42	18	30
Would Not Trust Again	35	2	15

Table 6: Percent of Subjects With Whom an Apology Re-established Trust With a Casual Friend After the Violation in Each Domain-Specific Story (Repeated Measure Design).

	Story		
Judgment	Moral n = 55	Social-conventional n = 55	Psychological n = 55
Would Trust Again	7	56	40
Maybe Trust Again	55	40	53
Would Not Trust Again	38	4	7

Table 7: Percent of Subjects With Whom an Explicit Statement Not to Repeat the Violation Re-established Trust With an Intimate Friend After the Violation in Each Domain-Specific Story (Repeated Measure Design).

	Story		
Judgment	Moral n = 55	Social-conventional n = 55	Psychological n = 55
Would Trust Again	24	86	71
Maybe Trust Again	58	13	26
Would Not Trust Again	18	2	4

Table 8: Percent of Subjects With Whom an Explicit Statement Not to Repeat the Violation Re-established Trust With a Casual Friend After the Violation in Each Domain-Specific Story (Repeated Measure Design).

	Story		
Judgment	Moral n = 53	Social-conventional n = 53	Psychological n = 53
Would Trust Again	15	66	42
Maybe Trust Again	53	23	32
Would Not Trust Again	32	11	26

Table 9: Percent of Subjects by Age Group Who Would be More Upset With an Intimate Friend or Casual Friend After the Violation in Each Domain-Specific Story (Repeated Measure Design).

Judgment	Story: Moral n = 20	Social-Conventional n = 20	Psychological n = 20
6-7 Year-Old-Subjects			
Intimate Friend	5	0	15
Casual Friend	35	30	20
Upset the Same With Both	60	65	60
Not Upset	0	5	5
8-9-Year-Old Subjects			
Intimate Friend	45	40	40
Casual Friend	15	10	20
Upset the Same With Both	35	35	35
Not Upset	5	15	5
10-11-Year-Old Subjects			
Intimate Friend	80	50	85
Casual Friend	10	5	10
Upset the Same With Both	10	20	5
Not Upset	0	25	0

Appendix A

Complete Trust Stories

Moral Trust Story

Let's suppose that during lunchtime one of your friends told you that he left his lunch at home. He asks you to share your lunch. So, you go ahead and share your lunch with him. Later in the afternoon, you find out that he really had his lunch with him after all. He just told you he didn't have his lunch so he could get more food.

Social-Conventional Trust Story

Let's pretend that your birthday is tomorrow. Your mom said that she would take you and a friend of yours to the fanciest and most expensive restaurant in town. So, you call a friend, and he is happy to go with you to such a fancy restaurant. The next day comes, which is your birthday, and you and your mom go to pick up your friend on the way to the restaurant. When you get to his house, you find that he is dressed in blue jeans and a torn work shirt, and that he is going to wear these clothes to the restaurant.

Psychological Trust Story

Let's say that one afternoon you are feeling really sad. And so you want very much to play with your best friend. Now, it happens that your friend likes watching television on this afternoon. And he likes watching television more than he likes to play. Even though you know this, you go over to his house. You tell him you are feeling sad and that you would like to play with him. Okay. Now he tells you that even though you are feeling sad, he is going to keep watching television.

Appendix B

Descriptions and Examples of Each Justification Category

Appeal to Fairness

Appeal to maintaining a balance of rights between persons.

MIT (8:8):

[Moral Story] It wouldn't be fair to me. Because he would have more food and I would have less. And we would be even if he just kept his mouth shut. I think he was being greedy. Too greedy.... He was lying. HOW? Well, he said he left his lunch at home and he ended up having his lunch. And I had less. WHAT'S WRONG WITH LYING? It's unfair. It's not nice. WHAT'S UNFAIR ABOUT IT? That's a good question. It's not fair to the person you lie to.

GIO (10:10):

[Moral Story] And then he has his full lunch and a half. And it just wouldn't be fair.

TYL (9:5):

[Moral Story] I would get less lunch and he would get much more. And he really had his lunch. He like took advantage of me. HOW DID HE TAKE ADVANTAGE OF YOU? Well, like when he said he didn't have it when he really did. WHAT'S WRONG WITH TAKING ADVANTAGE? Because it's sort of like cheating in a game or something. AND WHAT'S WRONG WITH THAT? Well, it is sort of just wrong, because you get more and the other person gets less. And really you just deserve the same amount. WELL, LET'S SAY THAT PERSON TOLD YOU "IT WAS OKAY FOR ME TO LIE SINCE I WAS HUNGRY." DOES THAT MAKE LYING RIGHT? Well, not really. Because he could have just gotten more food, if he had it at home. Instead of using my lunch. WAS THE PERSON LYING TO YOU IN THIS STORY? Yeah. HOW EXACTLY? Well he said he didn't have his lunch and he did. WELL, ARE THERE TIMES WHEN LYING IS OKAY? Well, when it's okay, I wouldn't really call it lying. CAN YOU GIVE ME AN EXAMPLE? Umm. Like if my sister says "I want to buy something, can I use some of your money." And I didn't really want her to use it, I could say "I didn't have any." Since it's not her money, I could say "no" any time. I don't think it would really be lying. HOW ABOUT IN THIS STORY. IS IT AN OKAY TIME TO LIE? This is a different time.

In these examples, subjects refer to maintaining a balance of rights between themselves and their friend. For example, TYL says "It is sort of just wrong, because you get more and the other person gets less. And really you just deserve the same amount." Notice that when TYL gives an example of when lying would be okay, he still bases his judgment on a concept of fairness (e.g., "it's not her money").

Moreover, that TYL provides a situation where lying would be okay, demonstrates that TYL does not believe lying is always wrong but wrong within the particular context of the moral trust story.

Other's Physical Welfare

Appeal to the physical interest of persons other than the actor:

SAR (11;3):

> [Moral Story. In response to why lying is unfair.] Because I don't have my lunch. And I'll be hungry for the rest of the day.

ROB (7;8):

> [Moral Story] WHAT'S WRONG WITH LYING? Well, it's like taking away part of my lunch.... I might have been hungry. And I didn't get to eat.

Interpersonal Emotional Concern

Appeal to the lack of emotional concern for persons other than the actor.

JOS (7;0):

> [Psychological Story] I don't think it was. Because it would make me feel bad that all he wants to do is watch television.... WELL, I HAD ONE CHILD TELL ME THAT IT WAS OKAY FOR HIM TO WATCH TELEVISION BECAUSE HE HAS A RIGHT TO WATCH TV IF HE WANTS TO. WHAT DO YOU THINK ABOUT THAT? I don't think it would be that good. It would make the other person feel bad. And the friend really wants to play with him. And he's got nothing to do.

GIO (10;10):

> [Psychological Story] No. Cause he wasn't considering my feelings. He wasn't caring for somebody. DO YOU THINK HE HAS A RIGHT TO WATCH TV IF HE WANTS TO? Yes, he does. But he should care for other people's feelings.

ANN (10;3):

> [Psychological Story] No. BECAUSE? Because she didn't care if I was sad or I was happy or I was mad. WELL, DO YOU THINK IT WAS ALRIGHT FOR HER TO WATCH TV? No. BECAUSE? I wasn't happy. And I wanted somebody to talk with me and play with me so I could be happy again. But she wouldn't do that because she was too interested in herself.... It's not nice.

These subjects judged the wrongness of the psychological story violation on the basis that it caused or at least maintained their emotional unhappiness.

Custom or Tradition

Appeal to social customs and traditions.

SAR (11:3):

> [Social-Conventional Story] She should have at least put on a nice pair of pants. WHY SHOULD SHE? Well, if it's a birthday, you usually don't wear a torn up shirt. Like I'm going to the chess championship at Oxford, and I'm not in old blue jeans. IN THIS STORY, WHAT'S WRONG WITH IT? It's just sort of like a custom. Or maybe not that but it's a special occasion for a birthday. And on a special occasion most people get dressed up.

ANN: (10:3):

> [Social-Conventional Story] No. Not at all. BECAUSE? Because we were going to a real good restaurant. And I told her that. And I would expect her to get dressed up a little bit. BECAUSE? Because it's a good restaurant and you are supposed to be dressed nicely in a good restaurant. I mean, you could wear blue jeans and a torn up work shirt to McDonald's, or something like that. But not to the finest restaurant in town.

These subjects based their judgments on an appeal to custom and tradition (e.g., "It's just sort of like a custom. Or maybe not that but it's a special occasion for a birthday. And on a special occasion most people get dressed up").

Personal Choice

Appeal to individual preferences or prerogatives, and to individual preferences and prerogatives that are juxtaposed with contrary statements.

DAI (11:0):

> [Social-Conventional Story] No, I wouldn't mind. WHY WOULDN'T YOU MIND? Because it's not really a big deal. BECAUSE? Because clothes are clothes.

ROB (7:8):

> [Psychological Story] Well, yeah, she can do what ever she wants. She can watch TV if she wants. And she doesn't have to play with me.

BEN (9;3):

> [Psychological Story] Well, I mean, it seems if that's what he wants to do, he should have a right to do it. He should feel like you are feeling sort of down and help pick you up. WELL, THEN, WAS IT OKAY FOR HIM TO SAY THAT? Hmm. It seems like he could have thought differently. But it's his mind, his body. He can do what he wants with it, sort of. He could have thought more of what you were feeling.

BEN's statement illustrates the personal choice justification ("it's his mind, his body, he can do what he wants with it") that is juxtaposed with that of interpersonal emotional concern ("He could have thought more of what you were feeling").

Maintaining or Establishing Relationships

Appeal to maintaining or establishing personal relationships.

JAS (9;4):

> [Moral Story] It's not honest. You have to be honest, especially if you are good friends. AND WHY IS IT IMPORTANT FOR GOOD FRIENDS TO BE HONEST? So you can keep friends.

JNN (8;7):

> [Moral Story] No. I think she should have just asked for it. WHAT WASN'T RIGHT ABOUT IT? Well, she should have told the truth. OKAY. WHAT'S WRONG WITH NOT TELLING THE TRUTH? Well, you're not going to get friends like that, if you don't tell the truth and they find out.

Social Discomfort

Appeal to subject feeling social discomfort.

MCK (11;0):

> [Social-Conventional Story] Yeah. Everyone probably would be wearing fancy clothes. And you would feel embarrassed that you came with somebody. WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY EMBARRASSED? Umm. Like you would feel bad that you came with somebody who was wearing those not fancy clothes. And you should have told her that she was wearing those not fancy clothes. And you should have told her that she should have worn nice clothes.

WES (8;2):

> [Social-Conventional Story] No. WHY? Because all the other, umm, he would be the only one that's not dressed fancy. OKAY. WHAT'S WRONG WITH THAT? He might

get embarrassed. People might start laughing at him.

These subjects emphasized that the violation caused them social discomfort: usually embarrassment. This justification is to be distinguished from that of interpersonal emotional concern in which subjects focused on the emotional hurt — rather than social discomfort — that resulted from the violation.

Obligation

Appeal to a priori obligations or duties between persons, including those of personal conscience and future trust.

MAT (9:1):

> [Moral Story] Well, it's okay but he will be feeling guilty after a while for doing it probably. WHY WOULD HE FEEL GUILTY? Sometimes like when I do something I'm not supposed to do, I feel a little guilty after doing it.

DAR (7:6):

> [Moral Story] WHAT'S WRONG WITH LYING? Well, if something is really important, the person, if she told a lie, then the person can't. Like if it was in a war and they asked when the people will be bombing, and they said right now and it was really later. GOOD POINT. BUT WAS THIS LIKE A WAR, LIKE A DANGEROUS SITUATION? No. SO, THEN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH LYING IN THIS SITUATION? Well, nobody could believe you. Like when something is really true, no one will believe you, because they know you are a liar.

These subjects justified their judgments on the basis of personal conscience ("he will be feeling guilty") and future trust ("like when something is really true, no one will believe you, because they know you are a liar"). Both types of references emphasize an appeal to a priori obligations.

Appendix C

Relational Orientations and Description of Responses

Orientation	Description of Orientation (Sample Responses in Parentheses)
Personal or Phenomenal	Judgments based on personal likes and dislikes and/or on reiterating salient facts that define the violation ("Because he did something I don't like"; "Because she lied to me"; "She likes to wear them"; "Because if she was my best friend, I wouldn't drop her"; "Because I wanted him to play with me"; "Because he didn't do anything to me").
Magnitudinal	Judgments based on the number of times the friend had committed the violation and/or on the magnitude of the consequences of the violation ("She would still be my friend as long as she didn't do it a lot of times"; "Like if he stole a clock from me, or something, then I would be mad and he would drop a little, but that's not what happened"; "It's nothing really").
Relational	Judgments based on the ways the violation did or did not affect interpersonal relationships ("After he lied to me, I wouldn't trust him"; "All those years of being friends and stuff, why let it go away in one day"; "Because she didn't think about anybody but herself"; "Cause they weren't feeling for you what you thought they might be feeling for you"; "Then I couldn't trust her").